The Syrian missile strike and the education of Donald J. Trump in the art of responsible statecraft by Aslam, Muhammad
        
Citation for published version:
Aslam, M 2018, 'The Syrian missile strike and the education of Donald J. Trump in the art of responsible
statecraft', Global Responsibility to Protect, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 420-447. https://doi.org/10.1163/1875984X-
01004004
DOI:
10.1163/1875984X-01004004
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 15. Oct. 2020
 1 
The Syrian missile strike and the education of Donald J. Trump in the art of 
responsible statecraft 
 
Dr Wali Aslam 
Senior Lecturer in International Relations 
Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies 
University of Bath 
Bath, BA2 7AY 
United Kingdom 
 
Email: w.aslam@bath.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
This article conducts a normative evaluation of the American missile strike on a 
Syrian airbase in April 2017 to assess whether it could be described as a responsible 
action. Marking a departure from President Trump's 'America First' approach, the 
missile attack was incessantly justified by administration officials using the 
terminologies of 'rights' and 'responsibilities.' The article utilises the theoretical 
propositions of the English School of International Relations to clarify the three 
benchmarks of a responsible action: acting legally, legitimately and prudently. A 
detailed examination of the official statements and the global political developments 
surrounding the strike suggests that although the action cannot be justified on the 
grounds of legality, it may still be described as responsible on the grounds of 
legitimacy and prudence. On its own, the strike can serve as an example of 
responsible statecraft, although these findings cannot be applied to the rest of 
President Trump’s foreign policy. 
 
Keywords: 'America First'; Donald Trump; Syria; Great power responsibility; International 
law; Legitimacy; Normative prudence 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The cruise-missile strike conducted by US President Donald J. Trump on a Syrian 
airbase on 6 April 2017 surprised many. Even though the President had promised an 
‘unpredictable’1 foreign policy during his Presidential campaign, very few expected 
that he would actually launch 59 missiles toward a Syrian airbase suspected to have 
been used for launching a chemical-gas attack on innocent civilians in the Khan 
Sheikhoun area of north-western Syria.2 At the start of President Trump’s term in 
office, prominent observers declared that the world would witness a Jacksonian 
presidency ‘not looking for opportunities for military interventions overseas’ and not 
interested in ‘grandiose plans for nation-building and global transformation.’3 It 
appeared that the US would not be interested in being the world’s policeman. Instead, 
it would pull up the drawbridge and focus on the problems at home. It was no wonder 
that the attack seemed to anger many voters who had purportedly voted for the 
                                                 
1 Kevin Sullivan and Karen Tumulty, ‘Trump promised an ‘unpredictable’ foreign policy. To allies, it 
looks incoherent,’ The Washington Post, 11 April 2017. 
2 ‘Syria chemical attack: What we know,’ BBC News, 7 April 2017. 
3 Walter Russell Mead, ‘Donald Trump’s Jacksonian Revolt,’ The Wall Street Journal, 11 November 
2016. 
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President’s ‘America First’ stance that was to focus on tackling the problems at home 
rather than intervening in distant conflicts.4  
 
However, pronouncements from the Administration’s foreign policy team in the wake 
of the Syrian missile strike showed no aversion to being at the centre of the 
international society of states. In fact, the language showcased the officials’ belief in 
the idea of an international society of states in which the members have certain rights 
and responsibilities. Furthermore, if a state did not fulfil its responsibilities, it could 
be censured, held accountable and even punished. For example, US Ambassador to 
the UN, Nikki Haley asserted at UN Security Council meeting on Syria held on 7 
April:  
Now, while the Syrian regime is responsible for the chemical weapons attack, it is not 
the only guilty party. The Iranian government bears a heavy responsibility. It has 
propped up and shielded Syria’s brutal dictator for years. Iran continues to play a role 
in the bloodshed in Syria. The Russian government also bears considerable 
responsibility.5 
 
Juxtaposing America’s role in response to those played by Iran and Russia, 
Ambassador Haley was clear that the US would act according to its responsibilities as 
a great power even if Russia and Iran did not do the same. She stated that ‘further 
delay by compromising with Russia for a watered down resolution would have only 
strengthened Assad. Strengthening Assad will only lead to more murders. We [are] 
not going to allow that.’6 Hinting at what would be expected from Russia as a 
responsible great power, Ambassador Haley said ‘the world is waiting for the Russian 
government to act responsibly in Syria. The world is waiting for Russia to reconsider 
its misplaced alliance with Bashar Assad.’7 
 
Instead of signalling an America in retreat, commentators suggested that the missile 
attack sent signals to Damascus (as well as Pyongyang and Tehran)8 that the United 
States was rooted within international society and was willing to use force to defend 
global peace.9 The Secretary of Defense, Jim Mattis, went to great length to highlight 
that the US action was undertaken after due consideration of Syrian defiance of 
international law. Referring to the common code of the international society of states, 
Mattis asserted, ‘The [US] National Security Council considered the near-century-old 
international prohibition against the use of chemical weapons, the Syrian regime's 
repeated violations of that international law, and the inexplicably ruthless murders the 
regime had committed.’10 Referring to the norms of international society once again, 
Secretary Mattis asserted that in future, ‘the Syrian regime should think long and hard 
before it again acts so recklessly in violation of international law against the use of 
                                                 
4 Edward Lozansky and Jim Jatras, ‘A sudden Syrian stumbling block,’ The Washington Times, 11 
April 2017. 
5 Amb. Nikki Haley, Remarks at a UN Security Council Meeting on the Situation in Syria, New York 
City, 7 April 2017; Available at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7755 
6 ibid. 
7 ibid. 
8
 Yusuf Selman Inanc, ‘Trump's missile attack aimed at both domestic, international audiences,’ Daily 
Sabah, 9 April 2017.   
9 Jack Caravelli, ‘U.S. missile strike on Syrian air base signals dramatic shift in Middle East policy,’ 
World Tribune, 7 April 2017.  
10 Tim Hains, ‘Defense Secretary Jim Mattis Press Conference Oo Syria, North Korea, Russia,’ Real 
Clear Politics, 11 April 2017. 
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chemical weapons.’11 Once again referring to the American responsibility in this 
instance, Secretary Mattis noted how the military action demonstrated that ‘the United 
States will not passively stand by while Assad blithely ignores international law and 
employs chemical weapons he had declared destroyed.’12  
 
The references to states’ rights and responsibilities were even visible in language used 
by the administration when describing the Russian alliance with Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad. Criticising Russia at the G-7 meeting in Lucca, Italy on 11 April 
2017, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated: ‘It is … clear Russia has failed to 
uphold the agreements that had been entered into under multiple UN Security Council 
resolutions. These agreements stipulated Russia as the guarantor of a Syria free of 
chemical weapons, that they would also locate, secure, and destroy all such 
armaments in Syria. Stockpiles and continued use demonstrate that Russia has failed 
in its responsibility to deliver on this 2013 commitment.’13 Reminding Russia of its 
responsibilities as a great power, Secretary Tillerson said: ‘It is unclear whether 
Russia failed to take this obligation seriously or Russia has been incompetent, but this 
distinction doesn’t much matter to the dead. We can’t let this happen again.’14  
 
Russia also came under attack during Tillerson’s comments delivered in an interview 
with CBS’s John Dikerson for not meeting its international commitments as a great 
power in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. Tillerson said: ‘it’s 
clearly the message is Russia gave certain assurances under the chemical weapons 
agreement in 2013 and in accordance with the UN Security Council resolutions that 
they would be the guarantor of the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons 
stockpiles. Russia has failed in that commitment.’15 He went on to assert that ‘[t]hey 
[the Russians] should have the greatest influence on him to cause him to no longer use 
those. I hope that Russia is thinking carefully about its continued alliance with Bashar 
al-Assad, because every time one of these horrific attacks occurs, it draws Russia 
closer in to some level of responsibility.’16  
 
Given the primary and extremely significant focus on states’ rights and 
responsibilities, it is pertinent to ask whether the US missile strike was indeed 
conducted in accordance with the norms of responsible statecraft as implied by 
various administration officials. A clearer question can be: Could the American 
missile strike on the Syrian airbase be described as the action of a responsible great 
power? This article will answer that question. The next section will provide a brief 
background of the President’s views on Syria before entering the office and how the 
missile strike appeared to be a diversion from those views. The third section will 
outline a theoretical framework rooted in the propositions of the English School 
theory of International Relations. It will present a brief introduction of the idea of an 
                                                 
11 ibid. 
12 ibid. 
13 Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, Remarks at a Press Availability, Lucca Italy, 11 April 2017; 
Available at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269693.htm 
14 ibid. 
15 Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, Interview With John Dickerson of CBS Face the Nation, West 
Palm Beach, Florida, 9 April 2017; Available at 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269632.htm 
16 Rex W. Tillerson, Secretary of State, ‘Interview With George Stephanopoulos of ABC This Week,’ 
West Palm Beach, Florida, 9 April 2017; Available at 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2017/04/269631.htm 
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international society at the heart of the English School. That is a society in which 
states have rights and responsibilities. But great powers, by virtue of their status, have 
additional rights and responsibilities in that society. Further engaging with the ideas 
of the English School approach, the fourth section will present specific yardsticks of 
legality, legitimacy and prudence that will help assess whether the American missile 
strike can be described as a responsible action. The fifth, sixth and seventh sections 
will apply each yardstick to the case of the US strike. The article asserts that though 
the strike may not be justified on the basis of legality, it can still be declared as a 
responsible action on the basis of the yardsticks of legitimacy and prudence. It also 
argues that the Syrian missile strike is one example of a responsible act on the part of 
the current administration. Where the lessons from it cannot be generalised for the rest 
of President Trump’s foreign policy, it is also not possible to say that any other 
irresponsible, recent American actions nullify the normative significance of this one.  
 
II. Donald Trump, Syria and ‘America First’ 
 
Many years before entering the White House, Donald Trump had repeatedly 
suggested the US should stay the ‘hell out of Syria’.17 He did not favour supporting 
‘the "rebels" [as they were] just as bad as the current regime.’18 He asked ‘WHAT 
WILL WE GET FOR OUR LIVES AND $ BILLIONS? ZERO.’19 After the 2013 
chemical-weapons attack conducted by the government of Syria in a rebel-occupied 
area of Damascus, Trump warned his predecessor to not launch an attack against 
Syria. He tweeted: ‘If Obama attacks Syria and innocent civilians are hurt and killed, 
he and the U.S. will look very bad!’20 Not only did he caution President Obama 
against attacking Syria in response to the chemical attack, he specifically urged him to 
seek Congressional approval should he decide to. Once more, he asked, ‘What will we 
get for bombing Syria besides more debt and a possible long term conflict? Obama 
needs Congressional approval’ and ‘he [the President] must get Congressional 
approval before attacking Syria – big mistake if he does not!’21 
 
For Trump, President Obama was forgetting to fix the problems at home by focusing 
too much on international affairs. In September 2013, President Trump tweeted, ‘[t]he 
only reason President Obama wants to attack Syria is to save face over his very dumb 
RED LINE statement. Do NOT attack Syria, fix U.S.A.’22 The stance of candidate 
Trump on Syria also remained unchanged throughout his presidential campaign, 
during which he attacked his opponent, Hillary Clinton, for her ‘failing Syria 
policy.’23 
 
Given this background, it is unsurprising that the American people, along with the rest 
of the world, saw the 6 April strike as an about-turn. President Trump not only 
launched the strike in response to the Syrian government’s chemical-weapons attack 
on civilians, he did so without the Congressional approval that he so vehemently 
                                                 
17 Nicholas Fandos, ‘Trump’s View of Syria: How It Evolved, in 19 Tweets,’ The New York Times, 7 
April 2017. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid.  
20 ibid. 
21 ibid. 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. 
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urged Obama to seek in the face of the same action. The strike was justified by the 
current US administration in the name of American national interest and was claimed 
to have strengthened US national security.24 On the night of the strike, the President 
said in his statement, ‘I ordered a targeted military strike on the airfield in Syria 
from where the chemical attack was launched.  It is in this vital national security 
interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly 
chemical weapons.’25 Where the attack angered many voters who voted for Trump’s 
‘America First’ stance,26 Sean Spicer, former White House Press Secretary, went so 
far as to say that the strike was not neglecting the ‘America First’ policy, it was 
actually ‘putting “America first.”’27 Spicer contended that American ‘national 
security is the first and foremost reason that we have to act,’ adding that the spread 
of chemical weapons was a ‘clear danger to our country.’28 As highlighted in the 
previous section, administration officials went to great lengths to discuss the episode 
in the language of rights and responsibilities. They were of the view that where the 
Syrian government and its allies did not stand up to their obligations, the United 
States will rise to its own duties as a responsible great power. The next section will 
study the notion of what it means to be a responsible great power in international 
society before proceeding to discuss whether the American action could be described 
as an example of responsible statecraft.  
 
III. The idea of ‘great power responsibility’ in international society 
 
When an action is described as either responsible or irresponsible, the debate is cast in 
a normative realm because the very connotations of ‘rights’ and ‘responsibilities’ are 
normative concepts. Accordingly, this article employs the theoretical and normative 
framework provided by the English School of International Relations to construct a 
normative criterion concerning the issue of ‘great power responsibility’. There are two 
reasons for selecting this theoretical approach in order to carry out this research: first, 
the English School approach has the scope to help conduct a normative analysis; and  
second,  this  approach  stresses  the  additional  responsibilities  of  great  powers  in 
international society. Where some proponents of the English School have conducted 
positivist study29, there are others who have provided scope for normative analysis.30 
The theory of Realism may answer some of the  questions  regarding  great  power  
responsibility  from  the  national  perspective  but it  cannot  address  them  from  the  
perspectives  of  those  who  believe  in  international society, international interest, 
international common good and international responsibilities of states – ideas 
frequently invoked and referred to by the members of the Trump Administration 
recently. The English School approach provides  one  with  a  set  of  ethics,  
regarding how things ‘ought  to  be’,  from  the  unique perspective of international 
                                                 
24
 Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Statement by President Trump on Syria,’ The White House, 6 April 
2017; Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/06/statement-president-
trump-syria 
25 ibid. 
26 Edward Lozansky and Jim Jatras, ‘A sudden Syrian stumbling block,’ The Washington Times, 11 
April 2017. 
27 Emily Ngo, ‘Spicer: Syria missile strike was putting ‘America first,’ Newsday, 10 April 2017.  
28 ibid. 
29
 Barry, Buzan, The  United  States  and  the  Great  Powers: World  Politics  in  the  Twenty-first 
Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
30
 Nicholas Wheeler and Tim  Dunne, ‘Good international citizenship and a third way of British 
foreign policy,’ International Affairs, 74 (4), 1998. pp. 847–870.  
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society. It is with the help of these ideals that one can evaluate the policies which 
have far-reaching repercussions.  
 
The  English  School  approach  has  the  scope  to  perform  the  proposed  normative 
analysis  because  it  puts  forward  the  idea  that  states  form  an  international  
society. Hedley Bull has defined international society as a: 
 
... group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values form a 
society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of 
rules in their relations with one another and share in the working of common 
institutions.31  
 
The rights and responsibilities of states in this international society are defined by 
international laws, and they ensue from a state’s membership of international society. 
The very idea of international society suggests a place where states have shared rules 
and norms.32 Seen from this normative angle, this theory sets out international 
society’s clear normative agenda as a starting point.  
 
Furthermore, the English School is the only theoretical approach which addresses the 
fact that the great powers have some additional rights and responsibilities in 
international society by virtue of their status. Other major theories of IR – including 
Realism, Liberalism and Critical Theory – do not specifically concern themselves 
with the additional responsibilities of great powers in international society in this 
unique way.33 For Neo-realists, the notion that power brings with it responsibilities 
does not carry much weight.34 As Brown argues, to  Neo-realists  ‘the  idea  that  
Great  Powers  have  special  responsibilities  to  international society as a whole 
makes little sense, because the notion of international society itself (as opposed to an 
international system) makes little sense.’35 The English School  approach,  on  the  
other  hand,  states  that  the  major  responsibility  for  the  efficient working of 
international society lies with the great powers. Hence this approach has the potential 
to provide one with criteria to assess whether the American missile attack against 
Syria could be described as a responsible action undertaken by the US, a great power.  
 
The English School of International Relations links three realities of IR: the 
international system, international society and world society.36 The international 
system approach is similar to traditional ideas of neo-realism and examines the role 
which power plays in IR. World  society  is  parallel  to  the  mainstream 
cosmopolitanism  which  takes  humankind  as  one  community. International society 
occupies the middle ground between these two concepts. It talks about the ‘shared 
interest and identity among states,’ thereby putting the shared norms, rules and 
                                                 
31 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 13. 
32
 Dale Copeland, ‘A realist critique of the English School’ Review of International Studies, 29 (3), 
2003, p. 427.  
33
 Bull, ‘The great irresponsibles? The United States, the Soviet Union, and World Order,’ 
International Journal, 35(3), 1980, pp. 437-47. Richard Little, ‘The  balance  of  power  and  the  great  
power  management’  In:  Richard  Little  and  John Williams,  (eds.) The Anarchical  Society  in  a  
Globalized  World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 97–120. 
34
  Chris Brown, ‘Do great powers have great responsibilities?’ Global Society, 18 (1), 2004, p. 10. 
35 Ibid, p. 11. 
36
 Barry Buzan, ‘The English School: an underexploited resource in IR,’ Review of International 
Studies, 27 (3), 2001, p. 471. 
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institutions at the centre of IR theory.37 This concept has been the main focus of the 
English School research. Thus,  according  to  the  English  School, when states 
pursue their national interest and balance the power of their adversaries (according  to  
Neo-realist  thinking),  they  also  acknowledge  the  presence  of  an  international 
society and a world society. In the English School perspective, the three elements 
have a ‘continuous coexistence and interplay.’38 
 
The international society of states focuses on the idea of the ‘international common 
good’. This idea brings concepts like ‘order’ and ‘justice’ into the discussion. 
According to this approach, international order should not be taken for granted since it 
is a fragile achievement which could be destroyed by the policies of irresponsibly 
aggressive states.39 This is the view which is usually stressed by the pluralist wing of 
international society. On the other hand, the solidarist wing of international society 
assumes that ‘there is solidarity or potential solidarity in international society 
sufficient to enable enforcement of the law against the law-breakers.’40 It stresses the 
potential among the society of states to reach an agreement to solve the problems that 
may go beyond the level of states, such as dealing with the problems of human 
rights.41 The pluralist conception argues that ‘states do not exhibit solidarity of this 
kind, but are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short 
of that of the enforcement of law,’42 According to pluralism, the minimum consensus 
achievable is on the issue of international order based on state sovereignty and non-
intervention. Pluralism holds that the common international interest is limited to the 
maintenance of international order that could be achieved by upholding international 
law (based on the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention) and the balance of 
power. International law clarifies what is considered to be in the common good. Thus, 
all states have a stake in upholding international law. Furthermore, according to the 
pluralist wing of the international society approach of the English School, 
international order emerges as an example of a ‘common good’ in international 
society, the preservation of which is the responsibility of all members of this society, 
and the great powers in particular.  
 
According  to  the  proponents  of  the  idea  of  an  ‘international  society’,  the  great 
powers have a different status in the realm of international politics from other states 
which  do  not  possess  such  military,  economic  and  political  strength.43 Great 
powers enjoy special rights and have special duties which they should perform to 
maintain their great power status and to contribute to the strength of international 
society.  In  other  words,  the  great  powers  have  responsibilities  which  relatively  
smaller  members  do  not  have  to  fulfil  because  it  is  due  to  their  military  and 
                                                 
37 ibid, p. 475. 
38 ibid, p. 476. 
39
 Andrew Linklater, ‘The  English  School,’  In:  S  Burchill  et  al.,  (eds.), Theories  of  International 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 105. 
40
 Linklater and  Suganami, The  English  School , p. 60; Hedley Bull, ‘Grotian conception of 
international society,’ In: Herbert Butterfield  and  Martin White, (eds.), Diplomatic  Investigations: 
Essays in  the  Theory  of  International  Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966), p. 52. 
41
 John Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986). 
42
 Bull, ‘Grotian conception  of  international  society,’ p. 52; Linklater and  Suganami,  The  English  
School  of  International  Relations, p. 60.  
43
 Jackson, The Global Covenant, p. 173. 
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economic strength that the great powers have the ability to influence the lives of many 
people on the planet.44 These very responsibilities give special rights to the great 
powers (one example of which is the possession of veto powers in the United Nations 
Security Council). The  English  School  approach  states  that  if  a great power has 
the ability to influence the lives of so many people, then a major obligation  of  a  
great  power  is  to  act  responsibly.  In this way, the very idea of a ‘great power’ is 
presented as a normative concept.  
 
The two wings of the international society approach – pluralism and solidarism –have 
different views regarding great power responsibility within international society. In 
this regard, pluralism holds that there exists a consensus across the society of states on 
the importance of international order as the greatest common good. Hence, according 
to this view, the preservation and maintenance of international order is the primary 
responsibility of great powers. In their justifications for the attack, the Trump 
administration officials frequently referred to the maintenance of international order 
as a justification for the attack. Pluralism is  a  relevant  approach  to  conduct  a  
normative  assessment  of  this  claim  because  it believes in great powers’ 
responsibility to protect international order.  
 
Hedley Bull, a major proponent of principles of pluralism, describes two primary 
roles for great powers. First, they contribute to interstate order by managing ‘their 
own relations  in  an  orderly  manner’,  and  second,  they  exploit  their  own  
‘dominant  positions in relation to the rest of international society in such a way as to 
strengthen rather than weaken the society of states.’45 The  great  powers  could  try  
to  achieve these goals by adopting various strategies, including: the maintenance and 
preservation of balance of power, avoidance and control of crisis, and limitation of 
war but use of force if necessary – and such use of force should not be ‘habitual and 
uninhibited but  occasional  and  reluctant’  but  the  great  powers  ‘will  rely  upon  
instruments  other than resorting to force.’46 If a great power decides to use force, it 
will only do so in ‘situations of extremity.’47 
 
In  his  analysis  of  Bull’s  thinking,  Dunne says  that  Bull  invested  in  great 
powers the responsibility for managing the society of states and to act as guardians of 
international order.48 Bull ‘recognized that although the practice of great power 
responsibility is at variance with the principle of sovereign equality, such an affront to 
interstate justice is a necessary requirement for interstate order.’49 That is why a great 
power may be justified in breaking international law, based on the principles of 
sovereign equality, to protect international order. However, ‘the legitimacy of the 
institution of the great powers depends upon how far they can make their special 
privileges acceptable to others. In making their dominant position legitimate’ and thus 
                                                 
44 ibid, p. 173. 
45
 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 207, see generally chapter 9; Nicholas Wheeler and Tim Dunne, 
‘Hedley Bull’s pluralism of the intellect and solidarism  of the will,’ International Affairs, 72 (1), 1996, 
p. 96; Nicholas Wheeler, ‘Guardian angel or global gangster: a review of the ethical claims of inter-
national society,’ Political Studies, 44 (1), 1996, pp. 123–135.  
46 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 207 and p. 215. 
47 ibid, p. 215. 
48
 Tim Dunne, Inventing international society: a history of the English School (Hounsmill: Oxford, 
1998), p. 147. 
49
 ibid, p. 147, Wheeler and  Dunne,  ‘Hedley  Bull’s  pluralism  of  the  intellect,’ p. 96. 
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acceptable to international society, ‘Bull argued, the great powers must accept their 
duties, which include the following: they should  refrain  from  disorderly  acts  
themselves’  and  ‘they  should  co-opt  aspiring secondary powers into the great 
power club.’50 Furthermore, Bull believed that the ‘desire for some minimum order in 
the international system is so powerful and universal that there is a certain disposition 
to accept an order that embodies the values of the existing great powers in preference 
to a breakdown of an order.’51 
 
IV. Legality, legitimacy and prudence as pillars of responsible statecraft 
 
The English School approach suggests the use of force by a great power is justified if 
there is a threat to greater international common good, defined in terms of 
international order. Pluralists believe that states within the international society 
uphold international law because it is in their interest to do so. Where pluralists 
acknowledge the importance of  the  Realist  argument,  they  believe  that  
international  law  is  something  which emerges in the form of a common good.52 
International law based on the principles of non-intervention and respect of each 
other’s sovereignty is something in which all states have a stake.53 Bull defined 
international law as one of the primary institutions of international society. It makes 
international society what it is because without properly defined norms serving as 
rules, international society would be indistinguishable from an international system.54 
In other words, by clarifying what is acceptable behaviour and what is unacceptable  
behaviour,  international  law  helps  mitigate  the  element  of  unpredictability from  
international  politics  and  strengthens  the  foundations  of  international  order  in 
international society.55 The great powers, given their status, have a responsibility to 
protect and uphold international law. As Simpson argued, international law helps 
‘legalise’ the hegemony of the great powers.56 In brief, acting legally is a major 
responsibility of any state in international society.  
 
International law, however, has some limitations of its own and there may come a 
time when a great power is unable to act legally.57  One  of these  is  that,  at  times,  
states  may  view  it  as  a  hindrance  towards  international  order rather than as a 
contribution to it.58 For instance, referring to the British and French decision not to 
deride the Russian invasion of Finland in 1939 for being contrary to international law 
(because doing so could have destabilised the balance of power vis-à-vis Germany), 
Bull thinks that international law may be sacrificed if it is in the interest of longer-
                                                 
50 Wheeler and  Dunne,  ‘Hedley  Bull’s  pluralism  of  the  intellect,’ p. 97; Dunne, Inventing 
International Society, p. 147. 
51 Bull, ‘The great irresponsibles?’ p. 439. 
52
 Edward Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001). p. 164. 
53 Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 137.  
54 ibid, p. 140. 
55
 Peter Wilson, The  English  School  and  the  sociology  of  international  law:  strengths  and 
limitations. Paper presented  at  the  annual  British  International  Studies  Association Conference, 
15–17 December 2003, Birmingham, United Kingdom, p. 2. 
56
 Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 67. 
57 Bull, The Anarchical society, pp. 142-5.  
58 ibid, p. 143.  
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term order in international society.59 In other words, a state can still act responsibly 
even if ignores the rules of international law. 
 
As the great powers are meant to be the guardians of international order, they may be 
justified in ignoring international law in the case of a consensus regarding it being a 
hindrance towards the achievement of international order. It is because the role of the 
institutions of international society is to protect international order and eventually to 
preserve ‘the system of states itself.’60 Hence a state may disregard law when doing so 
involves the higher aim of protecting international order and international society.  
 
A great power may claim that it has a legitimate reason to act to protect international 
order when it thinks that said order is under threat by one or more states. The great 
power may attempt to bring about a change that may be contrary to law:  
 
... if there is overwhelming evidence of a consensus in international society as a 
whole in favour of change held to be just ... then change may take place without 
causing other than a local and temporary disorder after which the international order 
as a whole may emerge unscathed or even appear in a stronger position than before.61 
 
Hence, an action that is not strictly legal may still be described as legitimate (and 
hence responsible) if it is conducted by garnering a consensus in international society. 
Clark has highlighted the importance of consensus for legitimacy.62 He believes that  
‘consensus  is  important  because  it  is  the  means  by  which  society  articulates its 
most basic purposes and values. Consensus is the benchmark of legitimacy in so far as 
it corresponds with these values.’63 However, consensus is not the only benchmark of 
a legitimate action. Clark includes international norms such as morality and 
constitutionality – ‘how affairs should be conducted’ – to be in the realm of 
legitimacy as well.64 In brief, an action would be legitimate if there existed a 
consensus among the members of the international society about it being in 
conformity with the principles of international society. In certain situations, a great 
power’s actions may be illegal but they could still be legitimate and responsible. As 
Wheeler and Dunne argue that although there is a ‘clear preference’ for UN 
authorisation ‘but in the absence of this [and]... in exceptional cases’, the great powers 
have ‘a duty to use force even if this weakens the rule of law in the society of 
states’.65  
 
Along with acting according to the norms of legality and legitimacy, members of the 
international society, especially the great powers, are expected to discharge their 
responsibilities prudently. It has  been  argued  that  without  prudence,  ‘political  
actors  will  be  either  thoughtlessly complacent, purely self-interested or inhuman, 
merely irrelevant to the ongoing life of their society, or the cause of mindless or 
groundlessly hopeful destruction or violence.’66 
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The use of prudence is crucial in the decision-making process of the great powers.67 
Jackson identifies two dimensions of prudence: self-regarding prudence and other-
regarding prudence.68 Self-regarding  prudence is  ‘personal  or  egocentric  prudence’  
that  ‘looks  ahead  and  proceeds  with  caution  in the anxiety that otherwise 
something unwelcome or something terrible might happen to me.’69 Thus, when ‘the 
self is simply me personally and nobody else’, then  this  prudence  would  be  
instrumental  prudence:  that  which  is  entirely  self-regarding.70 
On  the  other  hand,  if  self  includes  ‘somebody  else  and  becomes  we and  not  
just me alone – joint selves or a collective self – as it almost always does in the 
activities of  politics  and  war,  then  prudence  is  no  longer  entirely  self-regarding’  
but  becomes other-regarding, this can be described as normative prudence.71 If the 
great powers pursue their selfish interests and call their actions ‘prudent’ then that, 
according to Jackson, would be instrumental prudence.  On  the  other  hand,  if  a 
great  power  acts  to  uphold  the  greater  international  interest  (i.e.  the  interest  of  
the international  community)  and  is  driven  by  the  concerns  of  others,  not  only  
its  own, then  its  actions  would  be  justified  through  the  lens  of  normative  
prudence.  Hence Jackson argues that prudence becomes ‘a normative concept when it 
concerns others  besides’  us;  ‘it  is  a  political  virtue  to  take  care  not  to  harm  
others’  and  a ‘cardinal virtue’ when it concerns politics and especially the great 
powers.72 By using the principles of prudence, a great power can make difficult 
political decisions. Prudence, if employed, can help a great power understand the 
reality of the situation and  imparts  a  degree  of  foresight  to  the  decisions  
enabling  it  to  foresee  the  consequences of its actions.73 It will help this great power 
envisage the possible  courses  of  action  by  helping  it  decide  how  to  act  in  order  
to  promote  the common interest of society of states – which, with reference to the 
current case study, is ‘international order’. 
 
V. Great-power responsibility and the legality of the Syria strike 
 
The previous two sections have stipulated the key yardsticks according to which the 
American missile strike will be assessed. The first step towards learning whether the 
US missile strike on the Syrian airbase could be described as a responsible action by a 
great power involves assessing its legality. As concerns the issue of legality, an act of 
this nature is considered to be legal if it is conducted on the basis of a Security 
Council authorisation under Chapter 7 or if it takes the form of self-defence 
(enshrined in Article 51).  
 
The Security Council has been engaged with the Syrian war since its very beginning.  
In September 2013, it unanimously adopted Resolution 2118 which determined that 
‘the use of chemical weapons anywhere constituted a threat to international peace and 
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security.’74 The Resolution stated that ‘no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, 
acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer such weapons.’75 Here a key question is: can we 
say that the missile strike of 6 April was conducted to enforce Resolution 2118 or to 
punish for its violation? The answer would be in the negative. The text of Resolution 
2118 was specific in relaying that, in case of non-compliance, the Security Council 
would impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.76 Member 
states were not granted permission to resort to force in the absence of the Syrian 
compliance.  
 
The US’s use of force can also not be labelled as legal on the basis of a right to self-
defence. The Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons did not constitute an 
attack on the United States. The Trump administration also did not resort to the self-
defence argument as a justification for the strike. The Department of Defense 
statement on the matter mentioned that the US strike was to ‘deter the regime from 
using chemical weapons again.’77 The statement clarifies that it was a preemptive 
strike to deter the Syrian government from undertaking similar actions in the future. 
An attack would be legal according to Article 51 of the UN Charter if it had been 
conducted after an armed attack had occurred against the US; this was clearly not the 
case.78 
 
Given that the American justifications centred on the harm suffered by innocent 
civilians in Syria, could the action be justified under the customary norm of 
responsibility to protect?79 The controversial nature of the matter suggests that there 
was not unanimous support within the Security Council for the stance that the Syrian 
crisis required a military intervention. Given that situation, the missile strike could not 
be justified according to the accepted definition of responsibility to protect. Observers 
have indeed argued that ‘military intervention outside an authorization by the U.N. 
arguably violates U.N. prohibitions against unauthorized use of force.’80 Robert 
Jackson, a famous American judge, argued that no matter how much one agrees with 
the grave humanitarian crisis, one also has a duty to not confuse ‘the issue of a 
power's validity with the cause it is invoked to promote.’81  
 
David Tufari, however, has a slightly different view concerning how the Syrian strike 
can be justified according to the spirit of R2P.82 He believes that the spirit of the 
doctrine ‘stipulates that member states have an affirmative duty to prevent crimes 
against humanity even when the international community fails to satisfy its obligation. 
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In other words, member states are obliged to take action when the Security Council 
doesn’t.’83 Though a number of scholars in the filed might not find it possible to 
justify the missile strike according to the norms of R2P, Tufari believed that it had a 
‘legitimate’ legal basis.84 He believes that Trump’s claim urging us to ‘act in 
recognition of the horrors suffered by Syria’s children invokes the exact rationale 
underpinning R2P.’85 These views might have some currency but the fact remains that 
if seen from the widely accepted definitions of R2P, the action cannot be described as 
legal.  
 
After looking at international law, the next objective would be to assess the legality of 
the action from the perspective of US domestic law. As concerns this, it is commonly 
known that the US Congress is authorised to declare war. However, the United States 
War Powers Resolution does provide the President the possibility of short-term use of 
force in situations of hostilities. However, studying the American strikes against 
Syria, prominent American lawyers assert that the strike could not be justified as legal 
under the War Powers Resolution.86 That is because the case did not constitute a 
situation of hostilities as the other side (the Syrian government) did not have the 
capability to retaliate and did not do so.87  
 
The US has justified its airstrikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen on the 
basis of the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed by US 
Congress in 2001.88 The authorisation was granted to the President to attack Al-Qaeda 
and its associated forces.89 However, the AUMF cannot be used to justify an attack on 
the Syrian government that is itself at war with al-Qaeda and its associated forces.90  
 
The final justification for the use of force to be legal may come from Article II of the 
American Constitution. It authorises the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to use 
force in order to protect American national interest. President Trump also alluded to 
the national interest when informing the nation of the attack. He stated that it was in 
the ‘vital national security interest of the United States to prevent and deter the spread 
and use of deadly chemical weapons.’91 According to Jack Goldsmith, this reasoning 
was in fact developed by the Obama Administration when contemplating the 
possibility of attacking Syria after it crossed ‘red lines’ by using chemical weapons in 
August 2013.92 
 
According to Goldsmith, the Obama administration identified two areas in which the 
use of force could be justified through using the term ‘national interest.’93 The first 
one was the preservation of regional stability and the second was ensuring the 
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credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council. Where there 
might be a possibility to justify the use of force on the basis of the former, it is hard to 
do so on the basis of the latter. The Security Council is actively involved in the Syrian 
conflict and is fully able to decide whether it wanted to ensure its credibility and 
effectiveness by using force against the Syrian state. The use of force in the name of 
national interest for the preservation of regional stability, however, might have 
somewhat more credence. The President used that justification in his statement on the 
subject when he said that the Syrian ‘refugee crisis continues to deepen and the region 
continues to destabilize, threatening the United States and its allies.’94 The 
problematic nature of that justification is obvious, as any possible instance of 
American use of force may be justified on these grounds. As Jack Goldsmith has also 
argued, such justifications ‘will always be present when the President is considering 
military intervention’ and ‘these interests provide no practical limitation on 
presidential power.’95 
 
VI. The questions of legitimacy  
 
After noting that the legality of the missile strike is problematic, the discussion now 
moves towards studying it from the perspective of legitimacy. The framework 
outlined points towards a ‘consensus’ in international society as a benchmark of 
legitimacy. The current case demonstrates that the US action commanded substantial 
international consensus. Russia and its allies (Iran and Syria), on the other hand, 
clearly seemed to be outside the consensus.  
 
There was unusually high level of support in favour of the strike from almost all 
corners of the world. Shortly after it occurred, France and Germany issued a joint 
statement welcoming the strike. They asserted that the Syrian President, Bashar al-
Assad, bore full responsibility for the attack.96 The French President at that time 
Francois Hollande said that the strike was exactly what France wanted to do after the 
2013 chemical attack, but was unable to proceed due to the reluctance of President 
Obama and the then-British Prime Minister.97  
 
The President of the European Council contended that the strikes were a signal not 
just of American but also Western resolve against chemical attacks.98 His statement 
mentioned that the missile launches showed ‘needed resolve against barbaric chemical 
attacks,’ arguing that the ‘EU will work with the U.S. to end brutality in Syria.’99 
 
The attack took place as the Chinese President Xi Jining was visiting the United 
States and was President Trump’s guest at his private estate in Palm Beach, Florida. 
Donald Trump apparently mentioned the attack to the Chinese President over dinner. 
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Xi Jinping is reported to have ‘understood the US reaction given the deaths of 
children’100 and seen it as a ‘punishment’ for killing children.101  
 
A day after the attack, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying 
stopped short of directly criticising the US and simply called for calm and restraint.102 
This comes with the backdrop in which China has mostly sided with Russia regarding 
the Syrian crisis to the frustration of various Western capitals. Arguably, it would 
have been clearly too difficult for China to stay out of a clear consensus that emerged 
in the international community regarding the nature of the chemical attack.  
 
The Turkish President hailed the strike as a ‘positive step’ and said that the US could 
have done more to cause a greater damage to the ability of the Syrian President to 
inflict harm on his own people.103 The British government ‘fully’ supported the 
strikes and felt that the American response to the chemical attacks was wholly 
appropriate.104 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also supported the American 
action claiming that his government was informed an hour before the attack by the US 
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis.105 
 
The government of Israel praised President Trump’s resolve and expressed hope that 
the message sent by the US would resonate not only in Damascus, but in Tehran, 
Pyongyang and elsewhere.106 The Australian government praised the swift and just 
response of the United States.107 The Saudi government declared it to be a 
‘courageous decision’ by the United States.108 The New York Times noted that only a 
handful of countries opposed the American action (including Bolivia, Iran, Russia 
and, of course, Syria).109  
 
On 12 April 2017, a draft resolution supported by the United States, Britain and 
France was put forward for voting at the Security Council. The resolution condemned 
the use of chemical weapons in Syria and it called on the Syrian government to 
cooperate in investigating the attack. The resolution was supported by ten out of 
fifteen members of the Security Council with China, Ethiopia and Kazakhstan 
abstaining. Only two members, Russia and Bolivia, voted against the resolution.110  
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The Russian veto came as no surprise, as Russia used its veto for the eighth time in 
the six-year history of the Syrian war.111 The Chinese abstention, however, was out of 
the ordinary as China had used its veto six times since the war in Syria began. 
Significantly, the Russian diplomats came to the session with a rival draft resolution 
expressing concern at the American attack and included a condemnation of the 
strike.112 However, that resolution was not put to a vote. This was unsurprising 
because the resolution would not have gained much support given the overwhelming 
support for the American-supported resolution.  
 
Capturing the mood of the international community, US Ambassador Nikki Haley 
stated that there was a consensus in the international community supporting the 
American action and Russia, Iran and Hizbollah were isolated as the only supporters 
of the Syrian regime’s cruelties.113 Pointing to the consensus in favour of acting 
against Assad, she said  
 
People not just in the West, but across the Middle East and the world, are speaking 
out against Assad’s brutality. It is long past time for Russia to stop covering for 
Assad. It is long past time for Russia to push seriously for peace and not continue to 
be part of the problem.114 
 
The US was clearly claiming legitimacy for its action on the basis of the consensus 
present in support of the missile strike in the international community. The parallels 
with the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 are quite stark here. This Russian veto in the case of 
Syria is reminiscent of the time when it refused to act against the Serbian aggression, 
leading NATO to intervene to stop the atrocities against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. 
The Russian stance at that time was dubbed to be illegitimate and its vote was 
described as an ‘unreasonable veto.’115 
 
It has been asserted that a consensus regarding the use of force existed in the case of 
Kosovo at the Security Council and Russia halted action accordingly. There was no 
UN resolution to authorise NATO’s action, and it was believed to be contrary to 
international law.116 However a majority of states in the Security Council were in 
favour of acting against Serbia, and it was only because of an ‘unreasonable’ Russian 
veto that a UN resolution could not be passed to authorise force in that instance. A 
consensus held at the Security Council to do something to help the victims of Serbian 
aggression. Hence the report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
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concluded that intervention in Kosovo was ‘illegal but legitimate.’117 It was illegal 
because there was no UN authorisation behind the action, but legitimate nonetheless 
because there existed a consensus among the majority of member states to act. 
 
This claim regarding a presence of a consensus in NATO’s favour could be further 
substantiated by the fact that a draft resolution circulated by Belarus, Russia and India 
demanding a cessation of the use of force by NATO in Kosovo was defeated by a vote 
of 12-3.118 In opposing the resolution, the representatives of the Canadian government 
argued that a support for the draft resolution would place states ‘outside the 
international consensus, which holds that the time has come to stop the continuing 
violence.’119 The same sentiment might explain the Chinese reluctance to vote against 
the recent resolution against Syria. For China, the cost of staying outside the 
consensus outweighed the cost of abstaining.  
 
The Japanese case regarding Syria was also similar. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
supported the strike and stressed that ‘the Japanese government supports the U.S. 
government’s determination never to tolerate the further spread and use of chemical 
weapons.’120 Highlighting the link with international order and peace, Abe noted that 
Japan highly valued ‘the strong commitment of President Trump to maintenance of 
the international order and peace and stability of allies and the world.’121 However, 
relevant Japanese voices at home expressed worry that the stance might jeopardise 
relations with Russia, especially as, at the time, the former was interested in the 
latter’s concessions over Hokkaido islands disputed by Tokyo and Moscow since the 
end of World War II. Japan decided to side with the international consensus despite 
potential negative repercussions. 
 
Comparing the case of Kosovo with Syria highlights that the Russian use of veto did 
isolate it, as pointed out by Ambassador Haley:  
 
The United States takes no pleasure in seeing Russia isolated again on the Security 
Council … this vote could have been the moment when Russia saw that its interests 
do not lie with a murderous dictator, but rather with the many countries in the 
international community, including those across the Middle East, that want to end this 
conflict. By its failure, Russia will continue to be isolated. We urge Russia to join 
forces with the overwhelming number of countries that are pushing for a political 
solution. The international community has spoken. Russia now has a lot to prove.122 
 
In the Security Council meetings held on the matter, the US went to great lengths to 
point out that the Syrian government had ‘no friends in the world,’ clearly 
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highlighting its isolation.123 The US also warned the Security Council to not stand 
outside the international consensus for the fear that it might be rendered irrelevant. It 
said: 
 
This Council needs to be serious about peace in Syria too. Month after month, we all 
repeat the same points in this chamber. We all say there is no military solution to this 
conflict, but look at what actually happens on the ground. This Council’s relevance 
depends on taking action to condemn those responsible for violence and to hold them 
accountable for defying this Council’s demands. This Council should not just say it’s 
for a political solution but also actively pressure the parties to prove it. That means 
adopting resolutions that say what we mean – resolutions that we are all willing to 
uphold.124  
 
VII. The Syria strike and prudent statecraft 
 
The previous section highlighted how the American missile strike can be described as 
responsible due to its conformity with the norms of legitimacy. This section will 
assess the attack according to the principles of prudence outlined above. The ideas put 
forward in the fourth section stipulated that politicians often describe their action as 
prudent. However, the principles of the English School approach would assert that the 
use of this term is only appropriate if done so in a ‘normative’ sense.125 In this sense, 
it alludes to ‘other-interested behaviour’ as ‘we presumably do not want prudent 
aggressors or prudent rapists.’126  
 
The rhetoric of the Trump presidential campaign was very much centred on the notion 
of ‘America First.’ It was feared that an isolationist America governed by President 
Trump might do away with the key pillars, which had ensured a semblance of global 
peace since the Second World War. That sentiment was particularly pronounced in 
President Trump’s inaugural speech in which he said: 
 
For many decades, we've … subsidized the armies of other countries while 
allowing for the very sad depletion of our military; we've defended other 
nation's borders while refusing to defend our own; and spent trillions of 
dollars overseas while America's infrastructure has fallen into disrepair and 
decay.127 
 
However, the administration’s pronouncements with reference to the case of Syria 
seemed to suggest that the Trump administration was very interested in engaging with 
the international community. Furthermore (and as highlighted above), it repeatedly 
referred to the norms of the international society to criticise the actions of the Syrian 
government and its allies as well as to justify the American missile strike. 
 
The statements by the administration officials went to great lengths to assert that the 
strike not only benefited American national interest, it also served as punishment for 
                                                 
123 Explanation of Vote on a Draft UN Security Council Resolution on Chemical Weapons in Syria, 
Amb. Nikki Haley, New York, 12 April 2017; Available at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7764 
124 Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Syria, Amb. Nikki Haley, New 
York, 12 April 2017, Available at https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7762 
125 Jackson, The Global Covenant, p. 153. 
126 Ken Booth, ‘Military Intervention: Duty and Prudent,’ in Lawrence Freedman, (ed.), Military 
Intervention in European Conflicts (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 58. 
127 ‘Inaugural address: Trump’s full speech,’ CNN, 21 Jaunary 2017. 
 19 
the Syrian use of chemical weapons against innocent civilians, particularly children 
(an example of ‘other-interested behaviour’).128 One key intention behind the missile 
strike was to caution the Syrian government against any future uses of chemical 
weapons against civilians.129 The American action seemed to strengthen the norm of 
humanitarian intervention when the suffering of innocent civilians might cross a 
certain threshold. Specifically, it appeared to strengthen the taboo against the use of 
chemical weapons and helped in the cause of declaring their use as a ‘symbol of 
“uncivilised” conduct in international relations.’130 Supporting this viewpoint, 
Secretary Tillerson stated on the day of the strikes: 
 
It’s important to recognize that as Assad has continued to use chemical 
weapons in these attacks with no response – no response from the 
international community – that he, in effect, is normalizing the use of 
chemical weapons, which may then be adopted by others. So it’s important 
that some action be taken on behalf of the international community to make 
clear that the use of chemical weapons continues to be a violation of 
international norms.131 
 
Secretary Tillerson went on to say:  
 
The President is willing to take decisive action when called for. And I think 
in this particular case, the use of prohibited chemical weapons, which violates 
a number of international norms and violates existing agreements, called for 
this type of a response, which is a kinetic military response.132 
 
The statements appeared to be the evidence of the Trump administration’s wish to put 
a stop to the use of chemical weapons as they violated cherished norms of 
international society. Where the missile strikes might be unjustifiable through the 
standards of legality, they can be declared as actions of responsible statecraft on the 
basis of the norms of legitimacy as well as the principles of prudence.  
 
US relations with Russia provide a useful case to study the Trump administration’s 
willingness to think beyond the scope of its own interests. During the presidential 
campaign, Trump aides were often being declared to be too close to the Russian 
establishment. President Trump also asserted that ‘If Putin like[d] Donald Trump, 
guess what folks, that's called an asset, not a liability.’133 However, the administration 
seemed to be willing to risk damaging its ties with Russia in order to act against the 
Syrian government. Predictably, US-Russia relations were intensely strained after the 
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missile attack in Syria. Just a week after the strike, President Trump himself 
acknowledged that the ties between the two countries ‘may be at all-time low.’134  
 
Here it is essential to acknowledge that the singular case being studied here does not 
mean that the lessons learnt from it can be generalised to the rest of the US foreign 
policy under President Trump. However, this particular incident does suggest that the 
US appeared to be socialised into the norms of prudent statecraft (though it may have 
been a temporary effect). The statements by various administration officials in the 
introduction of this article would lead us to believe that this socialisation (albeit 
momentary) is not merely a result of the ‘emulating process of competitive behaviours 
imposed by an anarchic international system,’135 as Kenneth Waltz’s neorealist logic 
would dictate. Instead, it results from a conscious calculation that has come with 
certain costs at home.136 The primary cost of the United States expending its energies 
and precious resources on a foreign conflict might be seen as a ‘betrayal’137 by those 
who voted for him in the name of ‘America First.’ If the administration officials did 
not regard the course of acting as a responsible great power in the case of Syria as an 
appropriate one to adopt, it would appear that they would not have taken this path, 
given the quite obvious and major repercussions at home.  
 
Though the foreign policy of the Trump administration will be a topic of discussion in 
the years to come, the missile strike on Syria appeared to be an instance when the US 
elected to abide by the rules of the international society which strengthen its common 
foundation. This appears to be an example of the United States displaying an ‘other-
interested behaviour’ according to the theoretical principles highlighted above. In 
other words, the incident shows how Trump’s America displayed an interest in being 
prudent in a way that is beneficial for the wider international community and not just 
the United States alone.  
 
VIII. Conclusion  
 
It is too early to assess the foreign policy of the Trump administration. In this 
situation, it is possible to study it on a case-by-case basis. That is what the current 
contribution has endeavoured to do with reference to the case of the American missile 
strike against Syria in April 2017. It has done so by assessing it according to the 
norms of responsible statecraft. The article has argued that although the legality of the 
action might not be clear, the strike can still be described as a responsible action 
according to the norms of legitimacy and principles of prudence.  
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It is safe to suggest that there exist ‘mixed views’ on the Trump presidency and the 
President does not enjoy much popularity in the wider world.138 His rhetoric139 and 
Twitter outbursts140 evoke strong criticisms the world over. As far the contours of the 
actual foreign policy are concerned, we have to wait and see as it begins to unfold in 
the coming years. Given the strong views concerning the 45th President of the United 
States, it is pertinent that a study assessing a significant event like the Syrian missile 
strike does so on its own merits. A researcher tasked with the objective of answering 
the question of whether the Syrian missile strike could be described as an action of a 
responsible great power incorporating the English School approach would 
undoubtedly reach the same conclusions as this writing.  
 
We cannot deny the significance of a responsible action in one domain due to the 
leadership’s irresponsible rhetoric and actions at other fronts. Similarly, the 
pronouncements with regard to the normative evaluations here cannot be generalised 
across the entirety of President Trump’s foreign policy.  
 
This article has employed the theoretical principles of the English School to assess the 
Syrian missile strike. It has concluded that, on balance, the Syrian missile strike could 
be described as an example of responsible statecraft. A couple of qualifications 
regarding the theory are necessary. First, the theory is merely a tool helping us to 
answer the research question and to undertake the enquiry. It cannot be used to justify 
the American bombing of Syria, or of any other country for that matter. In other 
words, the English School theory helped us analyse the dynamics of legality, 
legitimacy and prudence in international society. These dynamics cannot be explored 
through another theoretical approach. The purpose of the theory is to clarify a 
framework consisting of three yardsticks, which are then employed to study the case 
of the Syrian missile strike. Second, President Trump’s pronouncements and some of 
his actions (such as instituting a travel ban on the citizens of certain countries from 
entering the United States) pose a challenge to English School theory that has the 
subject of ‘great power management’ of international society as one of its central 
tenets. A legitimate question can be asked: what happens if the great powers ignore 
the constraining norms of the international society?141 That is a fair question and can 
be explored in other contributions. The current work has limited itself to critically 
assessing just one instance from the contemporary American foreign policy and the 
theoretical principles of the English School have been operationalised for that 
purpose. It is hoped that future research will take up the matter of great powers’ 
ignoring the norms of the international society and what that means for the broader 
questions concerning the solidity of the English School as a viable approach. 
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